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TRILINEAR MAPS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHY
MING-DEH A. HUANG (USC, MDHUANG@USC.EDU)
Abstract. We construct cryptographic trilinear maps that involve simple, non-ordinary abelian
varieties over finite fields. In addition to the discrete logarithm problems on the abelian vari-
eties, the cryptographic strength of the trilinear maps is based on a discrete logarithm problem
on the quotient of certain modules defined through the Ne´ron-Severi groups. The discrete log-
arithm problem is reducible to constructing an explicit description of the algebra generated by
two non-commuting endomorphisms, where the explicit description consists of a linear basis
with the two endomorphisms expressed in the basis, and the multiplication table on the basis.
It is also reducible to constructing an effective Z-basis for the endomorphism ring of a simple
non-ordinary abelian variety. Both problems appear to be challenging in general and require
further investigation.
1. Introduction
Cryptographic applications of multilinear maps were first proposed in the work of Boneh and
Silverberg [1]. However the existence of cryptographically interesting n-linear maps for n > 2
remains an open problem. The problem has attracted much attention more recently as multi-
linear maps and their variations have become a useful tool for indistinguishability obfuscation.
Very recently Lin and Tessaro [2] showed that trilinear maps are sufficient for the purpose of
achieving indistinguishability obfuscation (see [2] for references to related works along several
lines of investigation).
In this paper we study cryptographic trilinear maps involving abelian varieties over finite
fields. At the AIM workshop on cryptographic multilinear maps (2017) Chinburg suggested
that the following map from e´tale cohomology may serve as the basis of constructing a crypto-
graphically interesting trilinear map:
H1(A,µℓ)×H
1(A,µℓ)×H
2(A,µℓ)→ H
4(A,µ⊗ℓ 3)
∼= µℓ
where A is an abelian surface over a finite field F and the prime ℓ 6= char(F). This trilinear map
is the starting point of our construction.
Suppose A is a principally polarized abelian variety over a finite field F. Let Aˆ denote the
dual abelian variety. Consider A as a variety over F¯, the algebraic closure of F. We have
H1(A,µℓ) ∼= Aˆ[ℓ] ∼= A[ℓ]. We have Pic
0A/ℓPic0A = 0, so NS(A)/ℓNS(A) ∼= Pic(A)/ℓPic(A),
where NS(A) = Pic(A)/Pic0(A) is the Ne´ron-Severi group . From
0→ µℓ → Gm
ℓ
→ Gm → 0
and H1(A,Gm) = PicA we get
0→ Pic(A)/ℓPic(A) → H2(A, µℓ)→ H
2(A,Gm)[ℓ]→ 0,
thus we can consider NS(A)/ℓNS(A) as a subgroup of H2(A,µℓ) and we are led to a trilinear
map
A[ℓ]×A[ℓ]×NS(A)/ℓNS(A)→ µℓ.
1
2For an invertible sheaf L, let ϕL be the map A→ Aˆ = Pic
0(A) so that
ϕL(a) = t
∗
aL ⊗ L
−1 ∈ Pic0(A)
for a ∈ A(F¯) where ta is the translation map defined by by a ([5] § 1 and § 6). Let eℓ be the
pairing between A[ℓ] and Aˆ[ℓ] ([5] § 16). Then in the trilinear map, (α, β,L) → eℓ(α,ϕL(β)),
where α, β ∈ A[ℓ], and L is an invertible sheaf.
Note that in the map just described we no longer need to assume that A is of dimension 2.
To construct a cryptographically interesting map, we need to work with the Ne´ron-Severi
group more carefully. We assume that A is a simple, non-ordinary and principally polarized
abelian variety.
Suppose L is an invertible sheaf associated to a Cartier divisor D. Let ϕD also denote ϕL.
Fix a divisor Θ such that ϕΘ is a principal polarization. Then L → λD = ϕ
−1
Θ ϕD determines an
injection from NS(A) to End(A), the endomorphism ring of A. For α, β ∈ A[ℓ], let eDℓ (α, β) =
eℓ(α,ϕD(β)). Note that e
D
ℓ is skew-symmetric ([5] Lemma 16.2 (e)). For any divisor D
′ such
that λD = λD′ , we have ϕD = ϕD′ , hence e
D
ℓ = e
D′
ℓ .
We choose a (random) divisor D1 and find β ∈ A[ℓ] such that ϕD1(β) = 0. For this we can
choose a random D such that the characteristic polynomial f(x) of λD = ϕ
−1
Θ ϕD has a non-zero
root a mod ℓ, therefore f(x) = (x − a)f1(x) mod ℓ, for some polynomial f1(x) ∈ Fℓ[x]. Let
λ = λD. Replacing f by a factor of f if necessary we assume that f(λ) = 0 mod ℓ but f1(λ) 6= 0
mod ℓ. Choose a random γ ∈ A[ℓ] so that (f1(λ))(γ) 6= 0, and let β = (f1(λ))(γ) ∈ A[ℓ]. Then
(λ− a)(β) = ((λ− a)f1(λ))(γ) = (f(λ))(γ) = 0.
Observe that λ − a = ϕ−1Θ ϕD−aΘ. So let D1 = D − aΘ. Then ϕD1(β) = 0 as desired, and we
have eD1ℓ (α, β) = 1 for all α ∈ A[ℓ].
With β and D1 chosen, we choose another random D2. Let λD2(β) = α. We have
eD2ℓ (α, β) = eℓ(α,ϕD2(β)) = eℓ(α,ϕΘ(α)) = e
Θ
ℓ (α,α) = 1.
In choosing D2 we also make sure that λD1(α) 6= 0. This implies λD1λD2 6= λD2λD1 since
λD2λD1(β) = 0 and λD1λD2(β) = λD1(α) 6= 0. It also follows that U/ℓU is of dimension 2.
Let E be the submodule of EndA containing all λD where D is a divisor. Let U be the
Z-submodule of End(A) generated by λD1 , λD2 , and the elements of ℓE. Let U1 be the Z-
submodule of End(A) generated by 1 and the elements of U .
IfD′ is a divisor such that λD′ ∈ U , then λD′ = λD for some divisor D = xD1+yD2+ℓD3 with
x, y ∈ Z and D3 a divisor. Since e
D1
ℓ (α, β) = e
D2
ℓ (α, β) = e
ℓD3
ℓ (α, β) = 1, we have e
D
ℓ (α, β) = 1 .
Since eDℓ = e
D′
ℓ , we have e
Θ
ℓ (α, λD′(β)) = e
D′
ℓ (α, β) = 1. So for λ ∈ U1, λ encodes 0 if and only
if λ ∈ U if and only if eΘℓ (α, λ(β)) = 1.
If D′ is a divisor such that λD′ ∈ a + U ⊂ U1 for some integer a, then λD′ = λD for some
divisor D = aΘ +D1 with λD1 ∈ U . Since e
D1
ℓ (α, β) = 1, we have e
D
ℓ (α, β) = e
aΘ
ℓ (α, β) = ζ
a
where ζ = eΘℓ (α, β). Since e
D
ℓ = e
D′
ℓ , we have e
D′
ℓ (α, β) = ζ
a.
Let G1 and G2 be respectively the cyclic groups generated by α and β, and G3 = U1/U with
1+U as the generator, we consider the trilinear map G1×G2×G3 → µℓ sending (xα, yβ, z+U)
to ζxyz.
Following the cryptographic literature, we write [a]i for an encoding of a ∈ Z/ℓZ in Gi for
i = 1, 2, 3. For a ∈ Z/ℓZ, [a]1 is the point aα and [a]2 is the point aβ. In particular the encoding
of a ∈ Z/ℓZ in Gi is deterministic for i = 1, 2. In contrast the encoding in G3 is probabilistic:
for a ∈ Z/ℓZ, [a]3 is λD, given in the form of a program PD, where D is a divisor such that
λD ∈ a + U . The length of description of PD is polynomially bounded in the length of the
description of D, and D is constructed to be linearly equivalent to aΘ + xD1 + yD2 + ℓD3 for
3some randomly chosen x, y,D3 where x, y ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ − 1} and D3 is a divisor (see § 2.3 for
details).
Given [x]1 = xα, [y]2 = yβ and [z]3 = λ such that λ ∈ z + U , the trilinear map can be
computed as eΘℓ (xα, λ(yβ)) = ζ
xyz where ζ = eΘℓ (α, β).
Suppose the Riemann-Roch space defined by a divisor is efficiently constructible, and the
pairing eΘℓ is efficiently computable. We will show in § 2 that under these assumptions the
trilinear map is efficiently computable.
The cryptographic strength of the trilinear map is linked to the hardness of the discrete
logarithm problem in the groups involved. The one group that needs special attention is G3 =
U1/U . In the discrete logarithm problem for G3 = U1/U , given λ ∈ U1 we are to determine a
such that λ ∈ a+ U .
In the cryptographic setting we assume that polynomially many instantiations of [1]3 are
known. From these encodings of 1 polynomially many divisors λ ∈ U can be obtained. Note
that for i = 1, 2, 3 and a, b ∈ Z/ℓZ, a[b]i is an encoding of ab in Gi.
To investigate the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem on G3 = U1/U , it will be useful
to consider the following more general formulation of a discrete logarithm problem concerning
the Ne´ron-Severi group NS(A).
Fix a principal polarization ϕΘ determined by an ample divisor Θ with χ(Θ) = 1. Let
ι : NS(A)→ End(A) be the injective map determined by ϕΘ under which the class of an invertible
sheaf L(D) associated to a Cartier divisor D is mapped to λD = ϕ
−1
Θ ϕD. Let E = ι(NS(A)).
We use || || to denote the bit-length in specifying a number or an object, whereas | | denote
the absolute value of a real number or the cardinality of a set. Thus ||A|| is the bit-length of the
description of A, including the addition morphismmA. We assume thatmA is effectively specified
in the sense that given a point a, b ∈ A(F¯), mA(a, b) can be computed from the description of mA
in time polynomially bounded in ||a|| and ||b||. We assume that ||A|| and ||Θ|| are polynomially
bounded in log |F| when g = dimA is fixed.
Suppose M is a submodule of E such that 1 6∈M . Let M1 be the submodule generated by 1
and the elements of M . An element λ ∈M1 is presented as a program that on input a point α of
A computes λ(α) in time polynomially bounded in ||λ|| and ||α||. We assume that polynomially
many λ ∈ M can be randomly sampled where ||λ|| is polynomially bounded in ||A|| (hence in
log |F| when g is fixed).
The discrete logarithm problem on (M1/M) ⊗ Z/ℓZ is: given λ ∈ M1, to determine a ∈ Z
such that λ− a = 0 in (M1/M)⊗ Z/ℓZ.
In § 3 we consider various attacks on the discrete logarithm problem.
We show that if M1 = Z⊕M , then the discrete logarithm problem can be effectively solved.
This is why in our construction the module U contains ℓE, so at prime ℓ′ 6= ℓ, U/ℓ′U = U1/ℓ
′U1 =
E/ℓ′E, consequently U1 6= Z⊕ U .
We show that, if M/ℓM is generated by mutually commuting elements, then the discrete
logarithm problem can be effectively solved. This is why we construct λD1 and λD2 in U where
λD1 and λD2 do not commute, and U/ℓU is of dimension 2.
We show that the discrete logarithm problem can be effectively solved ifM is contained in the
center of the endomorphism algebra End0(A) = End(A)⊗Q. The center of End0A is isomorphic
to a CM field Q(π), where π is a Weil number associated the Frobenius endomorphism. We
show that the injective map of E into Q(π) is efficiently computable, and with the injective map
the discrete logarithm problem is reduced to straight-forward linear algebra.
The running times of these attacks are polynomial under reasonable heuristic assumptions,
most notably that the bit-length of the characteristic polynomial for an endomorphism λ is likely
polynomially bounded in ||λ||.
4Our analysis shows that when M/ℓM can be generated by commuting elements or when M
is contained in the center of End0A, the discrete logarithm problem is tractable because we can
work with a commutative subalgebra which can be explicitly described. Therefore we choose A
to be non-ordinary, so that End0(A) is a non-commutative division algebra. Moreover E, the
image of NS(A) in EndA, should not be contained in the center of End0(A).
In summary there are two important features about the group G3 = U1/U .
(1) Non-compatibility at ℓ′ 6= ℓ: that U1/ℓ
′U1 = U/ℓ
′U = E/ℓ′E whereas U1/ℓU1 = Z/ℓZ⊕
U/ℓU .
(2) Non-commutativity of algebra structure: U1 is not contained in the center of End
0A and
U/ℓU can be generated by two elements in EndA that do not commute.
Our construction leads to two interesting problems. If either problem can be solved efficiently
for a simple non-ordinary abelian variety A then trilinear maps constructed from A are not
secure.
The first problem is, given λ, µ ∈ E such that λµ 6= µλ, to construct an explicit description
of the algebra Q[λ, µ], by which we mean a basis for Q[λ, µ] as a vector space over Q with λ and
µ expressed in the basis, and the multiplication table on the basis.
We say that an endomorphism λ ∈ EndA is effectively specified if for α ∈ A(F¯), λ(α) can be
computed in time polynomial in ||α|| from the description of λ.
A basis µ1, ..., µm for a submodule M of EndA is effective if µi is effectively specified for
i = 1, . . . ,m, moreover for every λ =
∑
i aiµi ∈M with ai ∈ Z, |ai| is polynomially bounded in
deg λ for all i.
The second problem is to construct an effective Z-basis for any submodule M ′ of EndA
containing M1, in particular M
′ can be E or EndA. It is an interesting question whether an
effective basis for E or EndA exists and can be efficiently constructed.
These two problems have not been investigated in depth from an algorithmic perspective and
appear to be quite challenging in general.
Fix as before a principal polarization ϕΘ and a corresponding injection ι from NS(A) to EndA.
The map ι naturally extends to an injection NS0(A)→ End0A where NS0(A) = NS(A)⊗Q and
End0A = EndA ⊗ Q. Through this map NS0(A) is identified with the subspace S of End0A
whose elements are fixed by the Rosati involution defined by ϕΘ. As before let λD = ϕ
−1
Θ ϕD for
divisors D.
Let D = End0A, a division algebra. Let K be the center of D, and let K0 be the subfield of
K consisting of elements fixed by the Rosati involution. Let d2 = [D : K] = d2, e = [K : Q],
e0 = [K0 : Q] and η =
dimQ S
dimQ D
. Abelian varieties can be classified into four types according to
these numerical invariants ([7] p.202). Non-ordinary abelian varieties are of Type II, III for IV,
where d ≥ 2.
If A is not Type III, then η ≥ 1/2, and dimQ S = ηd
2e ≥ 2e ≥ 2e0. In this case the image of a
random element of NS(A) in S is most likely not in the center K0. Consequently when choosing
D1 and D2 to form U , it is very likely λD1 and λD2 are not in K.
When A is Type III, η = 1/4, d = 2, and e = e0. In this case dimQ S = e = e0, so S ⊂ K.
Therefore Type III abelian varieties are not adequate for our construction.
2. What can be efficiently computed
As before divisor will mean Cartier divisor, and since we are dealing with abelian varieties,
we also think of them as Weil divisors.
For a divisor D, let L(D) denote the invertible sheaf associated to D. Let k(V ) denote the
function field of a variety V . Then
H0(A,L(D)) = {f ∈ k(A)|(f) +D ≥ 0} ∪ {0}, which we also denote as L(D).
5As a Weil divisor, a divisor D can be presented as a finite sum of prime divisors
∑n
i=1 aivi
where ai ∈ Z and vi is a prime of codimension 1. The length of D, written ||D||, is
∑n
i=1(||ai||+
||vi||) where ||a|| denotes the bit length of a for a ∈ Z, and ||vi|| is the length of the polynomials
that define vi.
For α ∈ A(F¯), the bit length of α, denoted ||α||, is proportional to n log |F′| where F′ is the
finite extension of F over which α is defined and n the dimension of the ambient space in which
the point is described. We can consider n a constant if the dimension of A is fixed.
We assume that a basis of L(D) can be computed in time polynomial in ||D|| and the dimension
of L(D). This is a reasonable assumption when dimension of A is fixed.
2.1. Computing λD. We discuss how the map λD = ϕ
−1
Θ ϕD can be efficiently computed.
Assuming that the pairing eΘℓ can be efficiently computed (which is the case for example when
A is the Jacobian of a curve), then it will follow that the trilinear map described in the previous
section can be computed efficiently.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose D is an effective divisor such that ϕD is an isomorphism. Then the only
effective divisor linearly equivalent to D is D itself.
Proof Since D is effective, H0(A,L(D)) = L(D) 6= 0, and since ϕD is an isomorphism, it
follows from Proposition 9.1 of [5] that D is ample. Since ϕD is an isomorphism, degϕD = 1,
and it follows from Theorem 13.3 [5] that 1 = χ(L(D)) = dimH0(A,L(D)). Since D is effective,
this implies L(D) contains only constant functions. Therefore the only effective divisor linearly
equivalent to D is D itself. 
Lemma 2.2. Given a divisor D and a point a ∈ A(F¯), λD(a) can be computed in expected time
polynomial in ||D||, ||Θ|| and ||a||.
Proof For divisors D and D′, ϕD+D′ = ϕD + ϕD′ . Therefore λD+D′ = λD + λD′ . Hence if
D =
∑
i aivi where vi is a prime divisor, then λD =
∑
aiλvi .
Therefore we may assume D is a prime divisor. Observe that λD(a) = b if and only if
ϕΘ(b) = ϕD(a) if and only if Da −D ∼ Θb −Θ if and only if Da −D +Θ ∼ Θb.
Compute some f ∈ L(Da − D + Θ), and let D
′ = (f) + Da − D + Θ ≥ 0. Then D
′ ∼ Θb,
from Lemma 2.1 we conclude that D′ = Θb. The running time for computing f is polynomial
in ||D||, ||Θ|| and ||a||. Note also that Da, D
′ and b are defined over F′ if a ∈ A(F′).
From Θb we can determine b as follows. Sample a random finite set S ⊂ Θ. Then b+ β ∈ Θb
for all β ∈ S. Solve for x ∈ A such that x + β ∈ Θb for all β ∈ S. This amounts to solving a
polynomial system. Note that x+ β ∈ Θb implies x ∈ Θb−β. Hence x ∈ ∩β∈SΘb−β. When S is
large enough the intersection is likely of dimension zero, hence the polynomial system describing
x is likely of dimension zero, and can be solved efficiently when the number of variables is
bounded. One of the solutions for x is b, and the correct x can be tested by randomly choosing
α ∈ Θ and check if α+ x ∈ Θb. 
We remark that when A is the Jacobian variety of a curve C, the problem can be solved
even more efficiently, by reducing to constructing functions in the Riemann-Roch space of some
divisor on C.
We assume that Θ has length polynomially bounded. A divisor D that is constructed in
polynomial time also has length of description ||D|| polynomially bounded. It follows from
Lemma 2.2 that λD is effectively specified. Assuming e
Θ
ℓ is efficiently computable, then the
trilinear map eΘℓ (u, λD(v)) can be computed in expected time polynomially bounded in ||u||,
||v|| and ||D||.
62.2. Computing the characteristic polynomial of an endomorphism. Suppose λ ∈
End(A) is presented as a program that on input a point α of A computes λ(α) in time polyno-
mially bounded in ||λ|| and ||α||. Let f ∈ Z[x] be the characteristic polynomial of λ. Then f
is of degree 2g, where g = dimA. To determine f it is sufficient by Chinese Remainder Theo-
rem to determine f mod ℓ′ for sufficiently many small primes ℓ′ with product greater than the
maximum absolute value of the coefficients of f . So after obtaining f mod ℓ′ for many ℓ′, we
have a candidate polynomial f for the characteristic polynomial of λ. We can check if f(λ) = 0
by applying f(λ) at a randomly chosen point and see if we get the zero point.
To determine f mod ℓ′ we first determine λ mod ℓ′ as a map on the 2g-dimensional linear Fℓ′-
space A[ℓ′], by constructing a basis e1, . . . , e2g for A[ℓ
′] and explicitly determining λ(ei) in terms
of the basis. This takes expected time polynomial in (ℓ′)2g and ||λ||. Then the characteristic
polynomial of λ mod ℓ′ can be computed, hence f mod ℓ′.
Therefore we have the following
Lemma 2.3.
(1) For prime ℓ′ not equal to the characteristic of F, the map λ mod ℓ′ can be explicitly
described in terms of a basis of A[ℓ′] in expected time polynomial in (ℓ′)g and ||λ||.
(2) The characteristic polynomial f of λ can be constructed in expected time polynomial in
||λ|| and ||f ||.
Recall that in forming D1 we need to compute the characteristic polynomial of λD for ran-
domly chosen divisor D. By Lemma 2.2 λD is effectively specified. We make the heuristic
assumption that for random D it is likely that the characteristic polynomial fD has length poly-
nomially bounded in ||D||, in which case fD can be constructed in expected time polynomial in
||D||.
2.3. Constructing a random representative of a divisor class. Suppose D is an effective
divisor. Since A is simple, if D is not ample then ϕD = 0, so λD = 0. This can be tested by
choosing a random a ∈ A(F) and check if λD(a) = 0.
Now suppose D is an effective ample divisor, and m ∈ Z>0, we discuss how we can construct
a random looking D′ ∼ mD such that ||D′|| is polynomial in ||mD|| = O(log |m|||D||).
Since D is effective, L(D) 6= {0}. Since D is ample, by Theorem 13.3 [5] it follows that
χ(L(D)) = dimL(D) ≥ 1, and dimL(sD) = χ(L(sD)) = sgχ(L(D)) ≥ sg. So the space of
divisors linearly equivalent to D has dimension sg − 1 > 1, when s > 1.
Choose small constant s, t greater than 1, so that m = sm1 + t for m1 ∈ Z≥0. Choose a
random f1 ∈ L(sD) and a random f2 ∈ L(tD). Let E1 = (f) + sD and E2 = (f2) + tD. Then
mD ∼ m1E1 + E2 and ||m1E1 + E2|| is polynomially bounded in ||mD||.
In our construction if a divisor D is chosen in the formD = aΘ+bD1+cD2+ℓD
′, we construct
a random looking divisor D′′ linearly equivalent to D to encode the class of λD + U = a+ U .
we can apply the above procedure to aΘ, bD1, cD2 and ℓD
′ respectively to construct D′0 ∼ aΘ,
D′1 ∼ bD1, D
′
2 ∼ cD2 and D
′
3 ∼ ℓD
′. Then D′′ = D′0 +D
′
1 +D
′
2 +D
′
3 is linearly equivalent to
D, so λD′ = λD.
If D is given in the form D =
∑
i aivi where vi is a prime divisor, we may apply the above
procedure to each vi that is ample to construct some D
′
i ∼ aivi. Then
∑
iD
′
i is linear equivalent
to D. The same process can be applied to D′i again, and by repeating this process sufficiently
many times, we can construct a divisor D′′ =
∑
i bivi mod ℓ where the sum involves many,
though polynomially bounded in number, prime divisors vi. We have λD = λD′′ =
∑
i biλvi
mod ℓ. Each λvi has a program pi of length polynomially bounded in ||vi|| by Lemma 2.2. The
7program for λD′′ can be specified in length
∑
i ||bi|| + ||pi|| , which is polynomially bounded in
||D′′||, hence in ||D||.
We have seen by virtue of Lemma 2.2 that the map NS(A)/ℓNS(A) → E/ℓE is efficiently
computable. An interesting question is whether the inverse is efficient to compute as well.
That is, given µ ∈ E, can we construct efficiently a divisor D such that λD = µ mod ℓ? In
light of the discussion in the next subsection, an affirmative answer would reduce the discrete
logarithm problem that concerns us to intersection product. The answer is in the affirmative
when EndA is commutative, and this will follow from Lemma 3.1. However the situation in the
non-commutative case is far from being clear.
2.4. Linear algebra on NS(A) reduces to intersection product. The reason why the
discrete logarithm problem involving NS(A) is specified in terms of elements in E is because
linear algebra in NS(A) and NS(A)/ℓNS(A) can be reduced to intersection product of divisors.
More specifically to determine a linear relation in NS(A)/ℓNS(A) between a divisor D and a
finite set of divisors D1, ..., Dn, we want to solve for xi such that D is algebraically equivalent
to
∑
i xiDi modulo ℓ. Let g = dimA. Observe that for a divisor H, the algebraic equivalence
implies D · Hg−1 =
∑
i xiDi · H
g−1 mod ℓ. Therefore by computing the (n + 1) intersection
products a = D ·Hg−1 and bi = Di ·H
g−1, for i = 1, . . . , n, we get a linear relation a =
∑
i bixi
mod ℓ. With sufficiently many linear relations we can determine xi. Therefore if the discrete
logarithm problem is specified in terms of divisors then the problem can be reduced to computing
intersection products. If g = dimA is fixed, then intersection products on A can in principle be
reduced to counting solutions of polynomial systems in bounded number of variables.
3. The discrete logarithm problem involving NS(A)
We discuss various attacks on the underlying discrete logarithm problem concerning the
Ne´ron-Severi group. Let us recall the general set-up of this problem.
Let A be a principally polarized abelian variety defined over a finite field Fq. Fix a principal
polarization ϕΘ determined by an ample divisor Θ with χ(Θ) = 1, and consider the injection ι
of NS(A) to End(A) determined by ϕΘ, such that the class of an invertible sheaf L(D), where
D is a divisor, is mapped to λD = ϕ
−1
Θ ϕD.
Suppose M is a submodule of E such that 1 6∈ M . Let M1 be the submodule generated by
1 and the elements of M . We do not assume that M is explicitly given, however polynomially
many elements of M can be randomly sampled.
The discrete logarithm problem on (M1/M) ⊗ Z/ℓZ is: given λ ∈ M1, to determine a ∈ Z
such that λ− a = 0 in (M1/M)⊗ Z/ℓZ.
3.1. The case M1 = Z⊕M . Given λ ∈M1, we want to determine a mod ℓ such that λ = a+µ
with a ∈ Z and µ ∈ M . To determine a it is sufficient to determine a mod ℓ′ for sufficiently
many small primes ℓ′.
We may assume that we have sampled enough elements of M that they generate M/ℓ′M as
a vector space over Fℓ′ . By Lemma 2.3 we can determine for each sampled element µ the action
of µ on a basis of A[ℓ′] in time polynomial in ℓ′g. Therefore we can construct a Fℓ′-basis µ1, ...,
µk of M/ℓ
′M in time polynomial in ℓ′g.
For all a0,..., ak ∈ Fℓ′ , we can check if λ = a0 + a1µ1 + ..., akµk mod ℓ
′ by acting on A[ℓ′] or
a basis of A[ℓ′]. Once the equality is verified we know that a = a0 mod ℓ
′. The amount of time
required is polynomial in ℓ′g.
In constructing our trilinear map we make sure that for ℓ′ 6= ℓ, U/ℓ′U = U1/ℓ
′U1, in other
words, U and U1 are indistinguishable mod ℓ
′. This is accomplished by including ℓE in U .
83.2. The case M/ℓM is of dimension no greater than one. Since deg is a (homogeneous)
polynomial function of degree 2g on End0A ([5] Proposition 12.4), it follows that deg(aλ) =
a2g degλ for λ ∈ End0A, moreover if λ, µ ∈ EndA and λ = µ mod ℓ, then deg λ = deg µ
mod ℓ. Hence the discrete-log problem in the case M = ℓE is reduced to degree computation.
In particular if λ = a mod ℓ then degλ = a2g mod ℓ. Determine the characteristic polynomials
of λ. From the constant terms of the polynomials we get degλ. Then a can be determined.
3.2.1. M/ℓM is of dimension 1. In the discrete logarithm problem we have polynomially many
samples of elements inM . Pick one λ such that λ 6= 0 mod ℓ, which can be checked by choosing
a random α ∈ A[ℓ] and verify that λ(α) 6= 0.
Given µ ∈M1 we want to find a such that µ = a+ bλ mod ℓ where b ∈ Z.
Since a+ bλ ∈ Q[λ] ⊂ End0A and Q[λ] is a commutative field, every root of the characteristic
polynomial of a+ bλ is of the form a+ bγ where γ is a root of the characteristic polynomial of
λ. The characteristic polynomial of a+ bλ is f(x−a
b
) where f is the characteristic polynomial of
λ.
Compute the characteristic polynomial g of µ. Then g(x) = f(b−1(x − a)) mod ℓ, where g
and f are known and a, b are unknown. Comparison of each coefficient gives rise to a polynomial
equation in a and b over Fℓ. Solving the system of polynomial equations we can determine a
and b up to a finite number of choices. Then determine the correct one by acting on a random
point of A[ℓ].
3.3. The case M/ℓM is generated by at least two elements. The line of attack described
below can be easily generalized, however for simplicity, we illustrate the ideas with the case
where M/ℓM is generated by two elements. So from the random samples of elements of M
pick two, λ and µ, then it is likely that they generate M/ℓM . Therefore the discrete logarithm
problem can be described as follows: given ω ∈M1, to find a such that ω = a+ bλ+ cµ mod ℓ
where b, c ∈ Z.
By an explicit description of the algebra K = Q[λ, µ] we mean a basis over Q as vector space
with λ and µ expressed in terms of the basis, and the multiplication table on the basis elements.
If λ and µ commute, then K = Q[λ, µ] is a commutative field of extension degree dividing 2g.
Let f(x) and g(x) be respectively the irreducible polynomials of λ and µ. An explicit description
of the algebra K can be obtained from f(x) and g(x) as follows. Factor g(x) over Q[λ]. Find
the irreducible factor h(x) ∈ Q[λ](x] of g(x) such that h(µ) = 0, by choosing random points w
on the variety A and checking if h(µ)(w) = 0. The field Q[λ, µ] is of extension degree deg f deg h
over Q, with λiµj, 0 ≤ deg f − 1, 0 ≤ deg h− 1 as a basis of Q[λ, µ] over Q. The multiplication
table on this basis can be written using f and h.
Then we can express the action of a+ bλ+ cµ on the basis with the help of the multiplication
table and from that determine the characteristic polynomial of a + bλ + cµ acting on K, with
coefficients being polynomials in a, b, c. This polynomial, if the degree is 2g, or a suitable power
of this polynomial, is the characteristic polynomial of a+ bλ+ cµ as an element of End0A. Then
from ω = a+ bλ+ cµ mod ℓ and by comparing the coefficients of the characteristic polynomials
of a+ bλ+ cµ and ω, we obtain a system of polynomials in a, b, c, from that we can determine
a as before.
However, if µλ 6= λµ, we run into difficulty if we try to mount the same line of attack. In
this case Q[λ, µ] as a subalgebra of End0A is not commutative and it is not clear whether one
can efficiently determine the structure of Q[λ, µ] explicitly. This is why in our trilinear map the
Fℓ-dimension of U/ℓU is generated by two elements that do not commute.
Below we give a reduction from the discrete logarithm problem to further clarify how the
security of our trilinear map depends on the hardness of constructing an explicit description of
the subalgebra generated by two non-commuting elements.
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generate M/ℓM . Therefore the discrete logarithm problem can be described as follows: given
ω ∈M1, to find a such that ω = a+ bλ+ cµ mod ℓ where b, c ∈ Z.
Suppose we are given a Q-basis of Q[λ, µ] with λ and µ expressed in the basis, as well as the
multiplication table on the basis. We want to determine a, b, c such that ω = a+bλ+cµ mod ℓ.
As before we can express the action of a+bλ+cµ on the basis with the help of the multiplication
table and from that determine the characteristic polynomial F of a+ bλ+ cµ acting on K, with
coefficients being polynomials in a, b, c. Let ρ denote the irreducible polynomial of a+ bλ+ cµ.
Let f denote the characteristic polynomial of a+ bλ+ cµ as an element of End0A.
Let dh denote the degree of a polynomial h. Then df = 2g, dρ|2g and dF ≤ [End
0A : Q] ≤ 4g2.
We have F = ρH, f = ρh for some polynomials H and h. For each choice of dρ|2g, we set up a
polynomial system as follows. Treat ρ, h andH as unknown polynomials. We have dF−dρ+2g+3
unknown including a, b, c and the unknown coefficients of ρ, h and H.
Let Fω be the characteristic polynomial of ω, which is of degree 2g. From Fω = f = ρh
mod ℓ and F = ρH, by comparing coefficients, we derive 2g+dF many polynomial equations. If
dρ ≥ 3 then 2g+ dF ≥ dF − dρ+2g+3. There are at least as many polynomial equations as the
number of unknown variables, so we expect on heuristic ground to have finitely many solutions.
For each solution we check if ω = a+ bλ+ cµ mod ℓ by acting on a random point in A[ℓ].
3.4. The case M is contained in the center of End0A. Let C(A) denote the center of
End0A. Then there is an isomorphism ι : C(A)→ Q(π) where Q(π) is a CM field and π is the
image of the Frobenius endomorphism πA under ι.
Lemma 3.1. The restriction of the map ι to E ∩ C(A) is efficiently computable; that is, given
λ ∈ C(A), ι(λ) can be computed in time polynomial in ||λ|| and ||f || and ||π||, where f is the
characteristic polynomial of λ.
Proof Suppose λ ∈ C(A). Then ι(λ) is a root of the characteristic polynomial f of λ. By
Lemma 2.3 f can be constructed in time polynomial in ||λ|| and ||f ||. By factoring f over Q(π),
we can express each root of f in Q(π) in the form m−1
∑
i aiπ
i where m and ai are integers.
This takes time polynomial in ||f || and ||π||. We want to check if λ = m−1
∑
i aiπ
i
A. If the
equality does not hold then mλ 6=
∑
i aiπ
i
A mod ℓ
′ with high probability for random prime ℓ′
not dividing m degλ. Therefore choose a small random ℓ′ not dividing deg λ and m, and check
that the equality holds mod ℓ′ by acting on A[ℓ′], as in Lemma 2.3. Then the correct root of the
characteristic polynomial of λ can be determined as the image under ι. 
Given polynomially many elements λ in M , we can by Lemma 3.1 efficiently compute their
images under ι and determine ι(M) as a subspace of Q(π).
Given λ ∈M1, we want to determine a ∈ Z such that λ−a mod ℓ ∈M/ℓM . This reduces to
finding a such that ι(λ)− a mod ℓ ∈ ι(M), which can be solved efficiently since linear algebra
in Q(π) is easy once elements are expressed in terms of the basis πi, i = 0, ..., e − 2 where
e = [Q(π) : Q].
If A is simple and ordinary then C(A) = End0(A). This is why we do not consider ordinary
abelian varieties.
3.5. The case when M1 6⊂ C(A). In this case the discrete logarithm appears to be difficult
generally speaking. However suppose we are given a submodule M ′ of End0A containing M1
together with an effective basis µ1, ..., µn of M
′ as a Z-module. Then the discrete logarithm
problem on M1/M ⊗ Z/ℓZ can be solved efficiently, as we show below.
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Since the basis for M ′ is effective, for each µi in the basis and prime ℓ
′, the action of µi on
A[ℓ′] can be explicitly determined in time (ℓ′)O(g). Moreover for every λ =
∑
i aiλi ∈ M
′ with
ai ∈ Z, |ai| is polynomially bounded in deg λ for all i.
Let λ ∈ M1. We can find ai ∈ Z such that λ =
∑n
i=1 aiµi as follows. For a small prime ℓ
′,
find bi < ℓ
′ such that λ and
∑
i biµi act the same on A[ℓ
′]. By Lemma 2.2 and the assumption
on M ′ we know that this can be done in (ℓ′)O(g) time.
Then ai = bi mod ℓ
′ for all i. By the assumption on the basis ofM ′, we only need to consider
all primes ℓ′ up to a bound polynomial in log(deg λ) in order to determine ai for all i by Chinese
Remaindering.
We have polynomially many λi ∈M and a λ ∈M1, and we would like to find a ∈ Z such that
λ− a mod ℓ ∈M1/M ⊗ Z/ℓZ.
We can determine the decomposition of all λi, for all i, λ, and 1 (as an endomorphism) in
terms of the basis for M ′ as above, and suppose ui, and v and v0 are respectively the coefficient
vectors in their decomposition. Suppose ui mod ℓ generate M/ℓM as a vector space over Fℓ,
which is most likely the case. Then v = x0v0 +
∑n
i=1 xiui mod ℓ for some xi ∈ Z/ℓZ for
i = 0, . . . , n. Solve the linear system over Fℓ to obtain a solution xi, i = 0, . . . , n, and x0 is what
we want, that is a = x0 mod ℓ.
3.6. Summary. In constructing the trilinear map we choose A to be a simple but non-ordinary
abelian variety with principal polarization. As discussed above, the construction gives rise to a
discrete logarithm problem on some U1/U ⊗Z/ℓZ where U/ℓU has a basis of two elements that
do not commute, and U1/ℓ
′U1 = U/ℓ
′U for primes ℓ′ 6= ℓ.
The discrete logarithm problem is reducible to constructing an explicit description of the
algebra generated by two non-commuting endomorphisms - a basis over Q, the multiplication
table for the basis, and the two elements expressed in the basis. It is also be reducible to
constructing an effective Z-basis for the endomorphism ring of a simple non-ordinary abelian
variety. Both problems appear to be hard.
For a simple abelian variety A the center of the division algebra End0A is a CM field Q(π)
where π is a Weil number (unique up to conjugacy) associated with the Frobenius endomorphism
of A. Our analysis shows that an endomorphism λD determined by a divisor can be effectively
expressed as an element in Q(π), if λD is in the center of End
0A. This is an important reason
why the discrete logarithm problem can be attacked when U1 is contained in the center of End
0A.
A consequence of Tate’s theorem ([8], also see Chapter 2 [10]) is that the local invariants of
End0A as a division algebra centered at Q(π) is completely determined by π. The question is,
apart from the center, how to explicitly and efficiently determine the structure of End0A, or in a
smaller scale, the subalgebra generated by two non-commuting elements. This is an interesting
and important problem for further investigation.
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